*1.* What exactly is the meaning, scope and ambit of the power of review which is inherent in the high court of Kerala at Ernakulam as a court of record in terms of Article 215 of the constitution and whether the power of review inherent in the high court as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution is distinct from the power of review vested in a civil court under order 47 rule 1, CPC and if so, what is the distinction?
*2.* Whether the power of Review falls in the province of substantive law which consists of two components, namely, a) the procedure or provision of law which expressly or by implication vests a right to institute a petition for review and b) substantive remedy, namely to grant a declaration that the judgement/order sought to be reviewed is void ab initio.
*3.* If in a provision for review, the substantive and procedural rights, both are embedded will not a judgement or order or punishment imposed (as in the instant case) without jurisdiction be liable to be declared to be void. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, did not the high court in its order dated 11.3.2005 (original order) and the order dated 6.2.2020 fail to declare that the order of the cooperative tribunal dated ___ in Appeal no. ____ is without jurisdiction in as much as it ordered the compulsory retirement of the petitioner where no such ground exists for compulsory retirement, but on the fallacious premise that it is constrained to do so, for it has no jurisdiction to impose the punishment which it felt appropriate, namely, reduction to the lower rank for no such rank exists, in as much as the Petitioner was appointed as Secretary.
*4.* If on the contrary, it is to be assumed for mere argument sake so as to sustain the impugned order, assuming the Petitioner to be in the shoes of the Respondent that there existed sufficient ground to compulsory retire the Petitioner, then was it not obligatory on the part of the Appellate Tribunal which proposed to increase the punishment from reduction in rank to compulsory retirement (it be noted that it is a mere argument contra), to expressly state so, which it did not.
*5.* As a corollary of the question supra, was not the Petitioner an employee entitled to a benevolent treatment (benignior sententia, in verbis generalibus seu dubiis, est preferanda) in as much as since the tribunal has no jurisdiction to award the punishment of reduction in rank and there exists no ground to order compulsory retirement, to award the next available punishment, namely, cancellation of the increments , reprimand, etc.
*6.* Does not the failure of the High court to advert itself to the above legal issues which were pleaded before it result in failure to discuss substantial questions of law of great import and will not that failure justify the invocation of the jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
